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LEGAL ANALYSIS AND THE "DE FACTO"
DOCTRINE
By ALEXANDER HAMILTON FREY t
A general incorporation statute in each state sets forth a procedure
whereby qualified persons may bring about the formation of a busi-
ness corporation (or corporation for profit). Although in many states
there is no explicit statutory enumeration of the legal consequences of
compliance with the terms of such a general incorporation statute, it
is generally understood that one of these consequences is that those
who become members (shareholders) of the corporation are not per-
sonally unlimitedly liable for its obligations.
This freedom from personal liability is not an inevitable incident
of incorporation. For example, until 1929 shareholders in California
corporations ' were unlimitedly subject to assessment to meet unpaid
debts of their corporations; today New York imposes personal liability
on shareholders for unpaid wages of their corporation's employees; 2
where the equities of a situation warrant it, a court may "pierce the
corporate veil" and hold the shareholder or shareholders individually
liable for an obligation of an association formed in complete and literal
compliance with the provisions of a general incorporation statute; '
and where the members of a partnership incorporate their joint enter-
prise, they may be personally responsible for goods purchased by the
corporation from those with whom the partnership had previously dealt
"who had not been notified of its incorporation.4
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1. The California Code, as amended 1873-74, read as follows: "§ 331. The di-
rectors of any corporation formed or existing under the laws of this state, after one-
fourth of its capital has been subscribed, may, for the purpose of paying expenses,
conducting business, or paying debts, levy and collect assessments upon the subscribed
capital stock thereof, in the manner and form and to the extent provided herein."
CAL. CIV. CODE AMEND. 206 (1874). In 1929 this section was amended to read as
follows: "§331(1) Shares are not assessable except as provided in this article. If
the articles expressly confer such authority, and subject to any limitations therein
contained the directors of any corporation may in their discretion, levy and collect
assessments upon all shares of any or all classes made subject to assessment by the
articles. This authority is additional to that of making calls for the unpaid sub-
scription price of shares." CAL. STATS. 1929, c. 711, § 17.
2. N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW § 71.
3. See WoRisER, DISREARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTON AND ALLIED CORPORATE
PRoBLEms (1927), and LATTY, SusmrARiEs AND AFFILIATED CoRPoRATIONs (1936).
4. See Mulkey v. Anglin, 166 Okla. 8, 25 P.2d 778 (1933).
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Conversely, limited liability may be achieved by members of busi-
ness groups without incorporating. For example, the members of as-
sociations such as the Pennsylvania "partnership association" ' or "reg-
istered partnership" " are accorded by statute freedom from personal
liability for obligations of their associations; " one's liability for a par-
ticular obligation may be limited by contract to a designated portion
of his assets; 8 and even a defective attempt to comply with the terms of
a general incorporation statute may nevertheless insulate the members
of the resulting association from personal liability for obligations of
the association. The object of this paper is not to explore all the areas
from which limited liability may or may not emerge, but rather to ex-
amine with particularity this matter of liability with reference to cer-
tain typical defects or irregularities in the process of attempting to form
a corporation under a general incorporation statute.
The purpose of this preliminary reference to incorporation without
limited liability, and to limited liability without incorporation, is to
dispose of the semantic dogmatism that limited liability is an attribute
of a corporation and only of a corporation. When the issue is in
doubt, one cannot logically determine that the members of an associa-
tion are or are not personally liable for their association's debts by first
arriving at a conclusion that the association should or should not be
labelled a corporation; similarly, if the appellation of an association is
in issue for some purpose other than limited liabiilty, one cannot logi-
cally maintain that the association is for all purposes a corporation
merely because the members of the association enjoy limited liability
with reference to the debts of the association.' During the course of
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§341-461 (Purdon 1930). See especially §381.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 241-321 (Purdon 1930). See especially § 261.
7. See Note, Buiness Associations in Pennsylvania, 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 151
(1933).
8. Such limited liability as is incident to a business (or "Massachusetts") trust
is essentially contractual. See Comment, Massachusetts Trusts, 37 YALE L.J. 1103
(1928).
9. Consider two rules of law: (1) the shareholders in a corporation are not per-
sonally liable for its obligations, and (2) a valid conveyance of real property can be
made to a corporation in its corporate name. Assume that, in an effort to form cor-
poration X, articles of incorporation are recorded in the office of the appropriate
secretary of state but not in the county where the association's principal place of busi-
ness is located; assume further that this omission is a violation of an applicable
statute. Thereafter, for the purpose of interpreting and applying rule (1), the
association is held to be a "corporation," and the shareholders not personally liable for
its obligations. If, subsequently, a case arises involving the interpretation and applica-
tion of rule (2), the previous interpretation of rule (1) is not controlling, and for the
purpose of construing rule (2), the association in question may be held, without doing
violence to the principal of stare decisis, not to be a corporation and not capable of
receiving an effective conveyance in its association name. The problems are inde-
pendent, and in each case the decision will turn, not upon the previous designation of
the association for some other purpose, but upon the particular court's conclusions as
to the policies to be subserved by the respective rules. If the defect is a failure to pay
in the required minimum of capital, this omission might be regarded as a strong
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this paper it will appear that some defects in the effort to incorporate
result, under certain circumstances, in the shareholders being per-
sonally liable for obligations of the association, and other defects do
not; whatever reason there may be for these divergencies, it is not to
be found by proclaiming that in the one case the would-be incorporators
formed an unintended partnership, and in the other a corporation.
If a business association purports to be incorporated under a given
general incorporation statute but literal and complete compliance with
the provisions of that statute has not occurred, what are the legal inci-
dents of the resulting association? Is the liability of the members of
the association for its obligations limited? Can an action be maintained
on behalf of the association in the association name? Can an action be
brought against the association without naming and serving the mem-
bers individually as parties defendant? Are the interests of a member
of the association transferable without the consent of the other mem-
bers ? The answers to some of these questions may be in the affirma-
tive and to others in the negative, depending upon the nature of the
defect in the attempt to incorporate and other relevant circumstances3 °
The association in question may be hybrid: it may have some attributes
which are normally associated with the term "corporation" and others
normally associated with the term "partnership." Where the facts'
giving rise to the association are admittedly abnormal or irregular, it
is only after its major incidents have been determined one by one that
an intelligent conclusion can be arrived at as to whether or not it is ac-
curate, i.e., feasible or convenient, to refer to the association as a corpo-
ration, partnership, business trust, joint stock company, etc. To con-
clude, for example, that the members of such an association are unlim-
itedly liable because their association is a partnership is to indulge in
circuitous reasoning, i.e., they are liable because they are liable. Where
the underlying facts are abnormal, there is no way of determining au-
thoritatively that the association "is a partnership" or "is a corpora-
tion," because no single case will have required a court to determine
that the abnormal association has all of the legal attributes of a nor-
mally formed corporation or partnership.
There are two propositions which very generally are stated by
courts and text writers with respect to the consequences of defective
attempts to incorporate. First, if there has been substantial compliance
with the provisions of a statute authorizing the formation of a corpora-
reason for holding the associates personally liable for obligations of the association,
but does it provide equal justification for denying to creditors of the association the
power to sue it in its association name, if they so choose, rather than by naming and
serving all of the individual associates as parties defendant?
10. See note 9 supra.
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tion having the objects and structure of the one in question (that is, if
the non-compliance is slight), a "de jure" corporation results, namely,
an association which the courts will recognize as a corporation for all
purposes and as to all parties, including the state of incorporation."
Secondly, if (a) there is a law in the state of alleged incorporation
under which such a corporation might be formed, and (b) there has
been a colorable or apparent attempt (c) in good faith to incorporate
under such law, and (d) some corporate "user" has occurred, i.e., some
exercise of corporate powers, a "de facto" corporation results, namely,
an association which the courts will recognize as a corporation for all
purposes and as to all parties except the state of incorporation; by quo
warranto proceedings the state may terminate the life as a corporation
of such an association, but no one else may challenge its corporate ex-
istence.' 2
Two major difficulties with this analysis present themselves. In
the first place, these propositions fail to reveal (a) what acts of incom-
plete compliance with the incorporation statutes are sufficient to consti-
tute "substantial" compliance, and (b) what acts, insufficient for "sub-
stantial" compliance, are nevertheless enough for a "colorable" or "ap-
parent" attempt to comply. Secondly, these propositions do not give
even a verbal indication of the legal consequences of purported incor-
poration where the acts done are less than a "colorable" attempt to com-
ply with the incorporation statute, or where one or more of the other
three elements of a so-called "de facto" corporation is lacking. This
traditional approach blandly assumes that merely by considering the
character or extensiveness of the defect in the effort to incorporate, it is
possible to predict all of the legal attributes which courts will ascribe to
the associates, e.g., all of the attributes of shareholders ("de jure" cor-
poration), or all of the attributes of shareholders except vulnerabiilty
to attack by the state ("de facto" corporation). But I suspect that it
is not possible to foretell with assurance even the presence or absence
of a single attribute, such as limited liability of the associates, merely
by_delling u pon_thefactual content of a particular defect in the attempt
to incorporate and the policies underlying the unfulfilled statutory re-
quirement.
To test this hypothesis I have sought to gather and analyze all the
reported American cases in which a "corporate" creditor " is seeking
11. See BALLANTINE, COReoRATIoNs 76 (rev. ed. 1946) and STEVENS, CoIRoRA-
TIONs 112 (2d ed. 1949).
12. See BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 11, 77 ff. and STEVENS, op. Cit. supra note
11, 139 ff.
13. The expression "corporate" creditor refers to a creditor of an association
resulting from a defective attempt to incorporate.
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to obtain a judgment against one or more of the associates ("share-
holders") personally, because of a non-compliance with some provision
of a general incorporation act concerning the prescribed procedure for
bringing a corporation into existence, and in which the outcome of the
case is not controlled by an explicit statute. 4
The typical general incorporation act provides that there shall be
drafted an instrument, most frequently referred to as "articles of incor-
poration," containing as a minimum certain stipulated items of infor-
mation, executed by a sufficient number of qualified incorporators, and
recorded in the office of the secretary of state and also with the clerk
of the county in which the principal office or place of business is to be
located." The payment of designated fees is usually required in con-
junction with the recordation of the articles. In addition to the fore-
going formalities, the statutes of many states further provide that "cor-
porate existence" shall not be-gin,--or the privilege of doing business in
corporate form shall not accrue, until a stipulated minimum of paid-in
capital shall have been obtained' The omission of any one of these
steps in the incorporating process may lead to the contention that the
members of the association are personally liable (as partners would be)
for its obligations, on the theory that the legislature offered the privi-
lege of limited liability only to those who would do the acts required
to bring a corporation into existence, that this offer was not accepted
because the required acts were not done, and that hence the associates
are not immune from the normal business consequence of personal lia-
bilityY Such claims have been occasioned more frequently by some
defects in the incorporating process than by others. I shall examine
herein only those cases which are concerned with the more provocative
defects.
' Preliminary research suggested two factors that might be of par-
ticular significance with reference to the liability of the associates for
obligations of the defectively "incorporated'-rassociation: (1) whether
or not the defendant associates were active in the management of the
association, and (2) whether or not the plaintiff dealt with the associa-
tion on a corporate basis.' 8  Although the relevant judicial opinion sel-
14. In some jurisdictions there are statutes which expressly impose personal lia-
bility on the shareholders. See, e.g., IOwA CODE §491.22 (1950)': "A failure to sub-
stantially comply with the foregoing requirements in relation to organization and
publicity shall render the individual property of the stockholders liable for the cor-
porate debts. .. ."
15. See, e.g., DEL. CORP. LAW ANN. §6 (1951).
16. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2852-208 (Purdon, 1950).
17. See, e.g., Dodd, Partnership Liability of Stockholders in Defective Corpora-
tions, 40 I-ARv. L. REv. 521 (1927), and Magruder's reply thereto in 40 HARv. L. REv.
733 (1927).
18. Throughout this article the plaintiff and the association are said to have had
"dealings on a corporate basis" if the association had been represented to him as in-
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dom stress either of these factors as part of the rationale underlying the
decisions, in the following analysis of the cases the presence or absence
6f each of these factors will be indicated in an effort to ascertain the
extent to which either may constitute an unexpressed major premise.
The cases will be grouped under each of the more frequent types of
defect.
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION NOT RECORDED AT ALL
Every general incorporation statute requires as part of the process
of incorporation some form of recordation of the articles of incorpora-
tion, almost always in the office of the secretary of state and usually
also in the county in which the principal office of the association is lo-
cated. One might suppose that any sincere effort to form a corpora-
tion would result in some recordation of the proposed articles of incor-
poration or other formative document. There have, however, been
thirty-five cases of actions against the shareholders personally based on
a complete absence of recordation of the articles. A typical instance
is where the articles are drafted and executed in due form and turned
over to an attorney for recordation, but he neglects to place the articles
on any public record at least until after the obligation has been incurred
upon which the "shareholders" are being personally sued.1"
One might further suppose that where no public record of the pur-
ported incorporation has been made, the courts will almost uniformly
hold that the associates have not gone far enough to achieve the attri-
bute of limited liability. But in twelve of the thirty-five cases the asso-
ciates are held not to be personally liable to the "corporate" creditor;
and if we analyze these cases with respect to whether or not the plain-
tiff dealt with the association believing it to be a corporation, the re-
sults are even more surprising. In ten of the cases the dealings were
not on a corporate basis, and in nine of these cases personal liability is
imposed upon the defendant associates.20 In the remaining twenty-five
corporated and if, in his dealings with the association, he did not contest the accuracy
of this representation; the parties are said not to have had "dealings on a corporate
basis" either if the plaintiff had not dealt with the association, as in the normal tort
case, or if the designation of the association is ambiguous and, in his dealings with the
association, the plaintiff justifiably assumed it was unincorporated or showed no con-
cern with its legal status.
19. See, e.g., Magnolia Shingle Co. v. J. Zimmern's Co, 3 Ala. App. 578, 58 So.
90 (1912) ; Tisch Auto Supply Co. v. Nelson, 222 Mich. 196, 192 N.W. 600 (1923);
Baker v. Bates-St. Shirt Co., 6 F.2d 854 (1st Cir. 1925).
20. Michael Bros. Co. v. Davidson & Coleman, 3 Ga. App. 752, 60 S.E. 362
(1908) ; Bigelow v. Gregory, 73 Ill. 197 (1874) ; Spencer Field & Co. v. Cooks, 16 La.
Ann. 153 (1861); Ferris v. Thaw, 72 Mo. 446 (1880); Smith v. Wrarden, 86 Mo. 382
(1885); Queen City Co. v. Crawford, 127 Mo. 356, 30 S.W. 163 (1895); Luck v.
Alamo Printing Co., 190 S.W. 204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) ; Bank of De Soto v. Reed,
50 Tex. Civ. App. 102, 109 S.W. 256 (1908) ; Owen v. Shepard, 59 Fed. 746 (8th Cir.
1894).
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cases the dealings were on a corporate basis, and the associates are held
to be personally liable in fourteen 21 and not liable in eleven.
22
In three of the cases where the dealings were not on a corporate
basis, the defendant associates were not active in the management but
are nevertheless held to personal liability,3 and in the one holding of
non-liability the defendant was a managing associate.24  In the twenty-
five cases where the dealings were on a corporate basis, inactive asso-
ciates are held liable ten times 2 and not liable nine times; 26 manag-
ing associates are held liable four times 27 and not liable two times.
2 8
From the foregoing analysis of the cases it would appear that if
the shareholders in a defectively incorporated association are charged
with personal liability because of a complete failure to record the pro-
posed articles of association in any public office, the judgment is ex-
tremely likely to go against them if the plaintiff did not deal with them
as an association with limited liability; but they have an almost even
chance of prevailing if the plaintiff, in his dealings with them, was
aware that they purported to be incorporated with the normal incidents
of a corporation including limited liability. Whether or not the de-
fendants were active in the management of the association at the time
the obligation arose seems to be of negligible importance.
21. Harris v. Ashdown Ass'n, 171 Ark. 399, 284 S.W. 755 (1926); Bailey v.
Sutton, 208 Ark. 184, 185 S.W.2d 276 (1945) ;' Pettis v. Atkins, 60 Ill. 454 (1871) ;
Coleman v. Coleman, 78 Ind. 344 (1881) ; McLennan v. Hopkins, 2 Kan. App. 260, 41
Pac. 1061 (1895) ; Spencer Field & Co. v. Cooks, 16 La. Ann. 153 (1861) ; Lind v.
Senton, 10 La. App. 633, 120 So. 535 (1929) ; Campbell v. Rukamp, 260 Mich. 43, 244
N.W. 222 (1932) ; Richardson v. Pitts, 71 Mo. 128 (1879) ; Weir Co. v. Bodwell, 73
Mo. App. 389 (1898) ; Abbott v. Omaha Co., 4 Neb. 416 (1876) ; Federal Advertising
Corp. v. Hundertmark, 109 N.J.L. 12, 160 Atl. 40 (1932); Tuccillo v. Pittelli, 127
N.Y. Supp. 314 (1911); Harrill v. Davis, 168 Fed. 187 (8th Cir. 1909).
22. Magnolia Shingle Co. v. J. Zimmern's Co., 3 Ala. App. 578, 58 S. 90 (1912) ;
Tarbell v. Page, 24 Ill. 46 (1860) ; Heald v. Owen, 79 Iowa 23, 44 N.W. 210 (1890) ;
John Lucas & Co. v. Bernhardt's.Estate, 156 La. 207, 100 So. 399 (1924) ; Lockwood
v. Vynkoop, 178 Mich. 388, 144 N.W. 846 (1914) ; Tisch Auto Supply Co. v. Nelson,
222 Mich. 196, 192 N.W. 600 (1923) ; Berlin Bank v. Nelson, 231 Mich. 463, 204 N.W.
92 (1925); A.W. Mendenhall Co. v. Booher, 226 Mo. App. 945, 48 S.W.2d 120
(1932) ; Mason v. Stephens, 16 S.D. 320, 92 N.W. 424 (1902) ; Baker v. Bates-Street
Shirt Co., 6 F.2d 854 (1st Cir. 1925) ; Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U.S. 392 (1879).
23. Spencer Field & Co. v. Cooks, Ferris v. Thaw, and Smith v. Warden, all
cited in note 20 supra.
24. Frawley v Tenafly Transportation Co., 95 N.J.L. 405, 113 Atl. 242 (1921).
25. Harris v. Ashdown Ass'n, Pettis v. Atkins, Coleman v. Coleman, McLennan
v. Hopkins, Spencer Field & Co. v. Cooks, Lind v. Senton, Campbell v. Rukamp,
Richardson v. Pitts, Weir Co. v. Bodwell, Abbott v. Omaha Co., all cited in note
21 snpra.
26. Magnolia Shingle Co. v. J. Zimmern's Co., Tarbell v. Page, Heald v. Owen,
Tisch Auto Supply Co. v. Nelson, Berlin Bank-v. Nelson, A. W. Mendenhall Co. V.
Booher, Mason v. Stephens, Baker v. Bates-Street Shirt Co., Whitney v. Wyman, all
cited in note 22 supra.
27. Bailey v. Sutton, Federal Advertising Corp. v. Hundertmark, Tuccillo v.
Pittelli, Harrill v. Davis, all cited in note 21 supra.
28. John Lucas & Co. v. Bernhardt's Estate, Lockwood v. Wynkoop, both
cited in note 22 supra.
1952]
1160 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100
One might expect that the cases in which the dealings were not on
a corporate basis would involve tort claims (which the plaintiffs did
not elect to suffer from corporations !), but actually in eight of the ten
cases the claims are for goods sold, money lent or services rendered;
the plaintiffs did not know or apparently care whether the association
to which credit was being extended was incorporated or not, and it is
for this reason that the transactions are herein classified as not having
been on a corporate basis. In most of the ten cases articles of incorpo-
ration had been drafted, but due to carelessness or negligence had not
been recorded at the time the claim arose. In one case a petition for a
charter had been applied for but it had not as yet been granted; 29 and
in the only case of dealings not on a corporate basis in which the de-
fendants are exonerated from personal liability,3 ° the articles had been
executed two days before the tort, were en route f6r recordation at the
time of the accident, were recorded the next day by the county clerk,
and were filed in the office of the secretary of state four days later.
In these cases where dealings were not on a corporate basis and
the defendants are held personally liable, the courts do not discuss the
purpose or policy behind the statutory requirements as to recordation
of articles of incorporation. In most of the cases the reason assigned
for holding the defendants liable is either that they did not incorporate
and hence are partners or that the failure to record the articles was
such a substantial defect as to make the incorporating process invalid,
and therefore the defendants did not immunize themselves from those
personal liabilities which are the normal risks of engaging in business.
The judicial reasoning is very similar in the fourteen cases where
the dealings were on a corporate basis and the defendants are held per-
sonally liable. In one of these cases the court states that the defendants
failed to incorporate and hence are liable whether they are partners or
not,3 but in most of the opinions the thought expressed is that the de-
fendants, having failed to incorporate, are partners and liable as such.
Some of the cases base the defendants' liability on the conclusion that
they have failed to create a corporation, "de jure" or "de facto." 32 It
is said in one of the opinions that the defect in the incorporating process
causes the defendants to be liable as partners unless the contract with
the plaintiff specifies that he, the obligee, will look to the association
only and not to the members of the association for payment.
3 3
29. Michael Bros. Co. v. Davidson & Coleman, mupra note 20.
30. Frawley v. Tenafly Transportation Co., supra note 24.
31. Richardson v. Pitts, supra note 21.
32. See, e.g., Harris v. Ashdown Ass'n, supra note 21.
33. Weir Co. v. Bodwell, supra note 21.
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The foregoing analysis reveals that, where personal liability is im-
posed upon the defendant members of the association, the general atti-
tude of the judiciary in these cases is that complete failure to record the
articles of incorporation nullifies whatever other steps toward incorpo-
ration may have occurred and leaves the associates with the unlimited
liability of members of a partnership, albeit an unintended one. Before
the validity or invalidity of this reasoning is discussed, the twelve cases
in which the defendant associates are held not to be personally liable
will be examined. Only one of these cases involves a plaintiff who had
not dealt with the association on a corporate basis. 4 At the time of
the accident upon which this plaintiff's claim is based the articles of
incorporation were en route for recordation, and were recorded the
next day. The plaintiff sued the corporation and the three incorpora-
tors individually. The corporation maintained that the individual de-
fendants were liable as partners, and that it was not liable, because the
process of incorporation had not been completed at the time the accident
occurred. The court gave judgment for the plaintiff against the cor-
poration only. This exoneration of the incorporators was apparently
on the ground that, prior to the accident, they had proceeded in good
faith far enough along a path which very shortly thereafter led to com-
plete incorporation: they had also purchased property and secured li-
censes in the corporate name, and had paid their employees in envel-
opes bearing the name of the corporation.
Some of the eleven cases of non-liability in which the dealings were
on a corporate basis present special facts. For example, in one case the
plaintiffs were directors of the unrecorded "corporation" who had lent
money to the enterprise and who sought to recover against the share-
holders as partners.35 The court gave judgment for the defendants on
two grounds: first, that the contractual relationship between them'and
the plaintiff was that of shareholders in a corporation; and secondly,
that the loan in question had exceeded the debt limit set forth in the
articles, and hence was unauthorized. Despite this latter factor, this
case does recognize that limited liability may be achieved by contract
even if an effort to incorporate is abortive. In another case the articles
had ben submitted to the secretary of state, but had been returned by
his office for certain corrections.36 On the same day the plaintiff bank
discounted a note of the association, admittedly presuming and suppos-
ing it to be a corporation. Here, too, the articles were duly recorded
not long after the transaction in question. The court held that the
34. Frawley v. Tenafly Transportation Co., supra note 24.
35. Heald v. Owen, supra note 22.
36. Lockwood v. Wynkoop, supra note 22.
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plaintiff, having dealt with the association as a corporation, was
estopped from denying its corporate existence for the purpose of charg-
ing the incorporators as partners. But most of these cases are not par-
ticularly different on their facts from the cases previously discussed
where an opposite result was reached. The significant distinction is in
the attitude of the court. In these cases in which the associates are ac-
corded freedom from personal liability, either the court proclaims that
their bona fide effort to incorporate produced a "de facto" corpora-
tion " despite the complete failure to record the proposed articles of in-
corporation at the time the obligation in question arose, or the court
asserts that the plaintiff, having accepted them as a corporation when
the transaction took place, is estopped s from charging the associates
with personal liability.
To summarize: In the cases where the dealings were not on a cor-
porate basis the courts are virtually unanimous in holding the associates
personally liable, and, in general, the professed justification is that the
defendants are partners, corporate existence not having begun because
of the complete omission of recordation of the articles. In the cases
where the dealings were on a corporate basis the courts are rather
evenly divided with respect to imposing personal liability on the asso-
ciates; the courts holding them liable employ substantially the same
reasoning as is found in the cases where the dealings were not on a cor-
porate basis; but the courts exonerating them from personal liability
have quite a different philosophy. They minimize the importance of
recording the articles, and concede that despite this defect a "de facto"
corporation may result if the association had other indicia of incorpora-
tion; or, while stating that a "de facto" corporation did not result, they
assert that the plaintiff is "estopped" by his dealings from denying the
defendants' corporate existence. Although this "estoppel" argument
is rather far-fetched since the plaintiffs did not misrepresent to the de-
fendants that the defendants were incorporated, nevertheless it is im-
portant as an oblique recognition that limited liabiilty may emerge from
a consensual transaction despite significant noncompliance with the
provisions of a general incorporation statute. To further test the
reaches of this "estoppel" doctrine, the next group of cases considered
will be those in which no attempt to incorporate had been made by the
associates who purported to be a corporation.
37. See, e.g., Coleman v. Coleman, Spencer Field & Co. v. Cooks, Lind v. Senton
and Richardson v. Pitts, all cited in note 21 supra.
38. See, e.g., Harris v. Ashdown Ass'n, Bailey v. Sutton, McLennan v. Hopkins,
and Abbott v. Omaha Co., all cited in note 21 supra.
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No ATTEMPT TO INCORPORATE
In one sense, these cases ought not to be included in this paper
since they present not a defect in incorporation but an absence of incor-
poration. But they provide excellent material for examining the readi-
ness of courts to uphold limited liability without incorporation, either
on an "estoppel" or a "contract" doctrine. If A, B and C, having taken
no steps to incorporate, nevertheless represent themselves to the world
as the Acme Hat Corporation, and if P enters into a transaction with
this business enterprise, believing from its designation that it is in fact
incorporated, should P be able to hold A, B and C personally liable for
an obligation emerging from this transaction? Is P "estopped"? Has
P contracted to limit his claim to the property which A, B and C have
permanently dedicated to this business enterprise and not to have re-
course to their non-business assets? If A, B and C have merely con-
tributed to the capital of the enterprise, but are not active in the man-
agement and did not participate in the transaction with P, is his case
against them stronger or weaker?
I The cases analyzed in the preceding section were all cases in which
some portion of the prescribed statutory procedure for incorporation
had occurred, usually at least the drafting of proposed articles of incor-
poration, but the recordation requirements had been completely omitted.
In the cases dealt with in the present section no articles of incorporation
were drawn up, and no steps taken in partial compliance with the pro-
visions of a general incorporation statute. The corporate aspect of the
business enterprise in these cases results either from a bald mislabeling
of the association as a corporation, or from a clumsy pretense of in-
corporation through some device such as the purchase of the "fran-
chise" of a defunct corporationO From the respective cases considered
as a group, it is apparent that the courts regard the absence of any at-
tempt to incorporate as much more significant, with respect to limited
liability, than total non-compliance with the requirements as to recorda-
tion of the articles. Seventeen cases 40 have been collected in which
39. See, e.g., Forbes v. Whittemore, 62 Ark. 229, 35 S.W. 223 (1896), and
Booth v. Wonderly, 36 N.J.L. 250 (1873).
40. Forbes v. Whittemore, 62 Ark. 229, 35 S.W. 223 (1896); Doyle-Kidd Dry
Goods Co. v. A. W. Kennedy & Co., 154 Ark. 573, 243 S.W. 66 (1922) ; Meinhard,
Schaul & Co. v. Bedingfield Co., 4 Ga. App. 176, 61 S.E. 34 (1908) ; M-Ree v. Quitman
Oil Co., 16 Ga. App. 12, 84 S.E. 487 (1915) ; Hagan v. Asa G. Candler, Inc., 189 Ga.
250, 5 S.E.2d 739 (1939) ; Liebold v. Green, 69 Ill. App. 527 (1897) ; McClaren v.
Dawes Electric Sign Co., 86 Ind. App. 196, 156 N.E. 584 (1927); Amer. Mutual
Liability Ins. Co. v. Condon, 280 Mass. 517, 183 N.E. 106 (I932>; Hughes Co. v.
Farmers Union Produce Co., 110 Neb. 736, 194 N.W. 872 (1923') ;-Booth v. Wonderly,
36 N.J.L. 250 (1873); Imperial Shale Co. v. Jewett, 169 N.Y. 143, 62 N.E. 167
(1901) ; Fuller v. Rowe, 57 N.Y. 23 (1874) ; Puro Filter Corp. v. Trembley, 266 App.
Div. 750, 53 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1943) ; Perrine v. Levin, 123 N.Y. Supp. 1007 (1910) ;
Seacord v: Pendleton, 62 N.Y. (55 Hun. 579, 9 N.Y. Supp. 46 (1890); Mapel v.
Long-Bell Lumber Co., 103 Okla. 249, 229 Pac. 793 (1924) ; Hess v. Werts, 4 S. & R.
356 (Pa. 1818).
1952]
1164 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100
claims of personal liability are asserted against members of associations
which purported to be corporations although no attempt to incorporate
had occurred, and in fifteen 41 of these cases the plaintiffs prevail.
In four 42 of the seventeen cases the dealings were not on a corpo-
rate basis, and in each instance the defendants are held personally liable,
although in two " of these cases they were not active in the manage-
ment of the enterprise. This factor of degree of participation in the
transaction out of which the suit arises seems to be a trifle more signifi-
cant here than in the preceding section. Where the dealings were on a
corporate basis, managing associates were defendants in seven 44 cases,
and inactive associates in six; " the managing associates are found to
be personally liable in all seven cases, whereas in only four " of the
other six cases are inactive associates so held.
In a number of the cases with which this section is concerned,
there is no clear-cut indication as to whether the plaintiff dealt with
the defendants on a corporate basis, and it must lie admitted that the
classification of some of these cases is unavoidably speculative. But
there is nothing speculative about the attitude of the courts. When
confronted with no attempt to incorporate the judicial mind summarily
rejects the idea of "de facto" corporate existence; 47 and even where the
plaintiff clearly thought he was dealing with a corporation, the courts
show little awareness of the "estoppel" doctrine4 which loomed large
in the preceding section. The reasoning of these courts seems to start
from the premise that when no attempt to incorporate can be found, the
members of the association are personally liable for its obligations, and
the fact that the plaintiff was duped into believing he was dealing with
a corporation will not be regarded as proof -that he contracted to limit
his claim to the assets of the association. In deciding in favor of the
41. The two cases in which plaintiff did not prevail are Fuller v. Rowe and
Seacord v. Pendleton, both cited in note 40 supra
42. Meinhard, Schaul & Co. v. Bedingfield Co., Liebold v. Green, Hughes Co. v.
Farmers Union Produce Co., and Mapel v. Long-Bell Lumber Co., all cited in note
40 supra.
43. Liebold v. Green and Hughes v. Farmers Union Produce Co., both cited in
note 40 supra.
44. Forbes v. Whittemore, McRee v. Quitman Oil Co., Hagan v. Asa G.
Candler, Inc., McClaren v. Dawes Electric Sign Co., Amer. Mutual Liability Ins.
Co. v. Condon, Booth v. Wonderly, and Puro Filter Corp. v. Trembley, all cited in
note 40 supra.
45. .Doyle-Kidd Dry Goods Co. v. A. W. Kennedy & Co., Imperial Shale Co. v.
Jewett, Fuller v. Rowe, Perrine v. Levin, Seacord v. Pendleton, and Hess v. Werts,
all cited in note 40 supra.
46. Doyle-Kidd Dry Goods Co. v. A. W. Kennedy & Co., Imperial Shale Co. v.
Jewett, Perrine v. Levin, and Hess v. Werts, all cited in note 40 supra.
47. See, e.g., Doyle-Kidd Dry Goods Co. v. A. W. Kennedy & Co., and Hughes
Co. v. Farmers Union Produce Co., both cited in note 40 supra.
48. See, e.g., McClaren v. Dawes Electric Sign Co., and Puro Filter Corp. v.
Trembley, both cited in note 40 supra.
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plaintiff, some courts specifically refer to the doctrine that an agent for
a non-existent principal is personally liable. 9 Since the courts are ap-
parently ready to hold the defendants liable in any event, it is little won-
der that they sometimes do not bother to reveal whether or not the deal-
ings were on a corporate basis.
The analysis of the cases in this section substantiates the classical
"de facto" doctrine to this extent: for limited liability based on pur-
ported incorporation there must be some bona fide attempt to comply
with the provisions of a general incorporation statute. But from these
cases one cannot deduce how much or how little compliance will suffice.
A further analysis of the partial compliance cases is needed; the cases
in which the articles of incorporation were recorded locally but not with
the secretary of state will next be examined.
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION NOT RECORDED WITH SE&RETARY OF
STATE BUT RECORDED LOCALLY
In every state the general incorporation statute requires the pro-
posed articles of incorporation to be recorded (or filed) with a state
official, almost always the secretary of state, but occasionally a corpo-
ration commission or an equivalent body. Many states require the arti-
cles also to be recorded locally, usually in the office of the clerk of the
county where the corporation's principal office is to be located, or in the
office of a probate judge or similar official. If this system of dual re-
cordation is in effect, the articles are usually required to be recorded
(or filed) first in the office of the secretary of state and then with the
local official, although in some states this process is reversed. The
cases presented in this section are all cases in which the applicable stat-
ute required dual recording, and in which the articles were recorded
locally, but not in the office of the secretary of state at the time the
plaintiff's claim arose. Sixteen such cases have been discovered; 50 it
so happens that in all of them the dealings appear to have been on a
corporate basis.
49. See Hagan v. Asa G. Candler, Booth v. Wonderly, and Puro Filter Corp. v.
Trembley, all cited in note 40 supra.
50. Morse v. Burkart Mfg. Co., 154 Ark. 362, 242 S.W. 810 (1922); Wesco
Supply Co. v. Smith, 134 Ark. 23, 203 S.W. 6 (1918) ; Garnett v. Richardson, 35 Ark.
144 (1879) ; Doty v. Patterson, 155 Ind. 60, 64, 56 N.E. 668, 669 (1900) ; Bond &
Braswell v. Scott Lumber Co., 128 La. 818, 55 So. 468 (1911); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Thomas, 33 S.W.2d 1033 (Mo. 1930); Martin v. Fewell, 79
Mo. 401 (1883) ; Hurt v. Salisbury, 55 Mo. 310 (1874) ; Farmers Bank v. Kuchs,
163 Mo. App. 606, 147 S.W. 862 (1912) ; Glenn v. Bergmann, 20 Mo. App. 343 (1886) ;
Nebraska Bank v. Ferguson, 49 Neb. 109, 68 N.W. 370 (1896) ; Burstein v. Palermo,
104 N.J.L. 414, 140 Atl. 326 (1928) ; Vanneman v. Young, 52 N.J.L. 403, 20 Atl.
53 (1890) ; Jessup v. Carnegie, 80 N.Y. 441 (1880) ; Mitchell v. Jensen, 29 Utah 346,
81 Pac. 165 (1905) ; Heisen v. Churchill, 205 Fed. 368 (7th Cir. 1913).
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These cases reveal no decided trend: in nine cases " the defend-
ants are exonerated from personal liability, and in seven cases 52 the
plaintiffs prevail. It will be noted, however, that the states divide seven
to three in favor of the defendants. Participation in the management
of the enterprise by the defendants did not materially affect the out-
come. In five of the sixteen 'cases the defendants were active in the
management; they are held liable in two cases,5" and not liable in
three.54 In the remaining eleven cases actions against associates not
active in the management are successful in five instances, 5 and unsuc-
cessful in six. 6
The cases in which the courts refused to hold the associates per-
sonally liable most frequently relied upon the "de facto" doctrine as
justification for this result. 7 But some of the decisions in favor of the
defendants were also based on the theory that plaintiff, having dealt
with the dssociation as a corporation, was estopped to deny its corpo-
rate existence,"8 despite the failure to record the articles with the sec-
retary of state.
Where an opposite result was reached, the typical reasoning was
that there could be no corporate existence prior to recording the arti-
cles with the secretary of state,59 and that "therefore" the members or
officers of the association were personally liable. It should be noted
that in at least one of the cases " the outcome may have been influ-
enced by the presence of other defects in the attempt to incorporate.
The most startling fact about this group of cases is that the courts
appear to give little or no consideration to the purpose behind the re-
quirement of recordation of the articles in the office of the secretary of
51. Wesco Supply Co. v. Smith, Doty v. Patterson, Bond & Breswell v. Scott
Lumber Co., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Thomas, Farmers Bank v. Kuchs,
Nebraska Bank v. Ferguson, Burstein v Palermo, Vanneman v. Young, Jessup v.
Carnegie, all cited in note 50 supra.
52. Morse v. Burkart Mfg. Co., Garnett v. Richardson, Martin v. Fewell, Hurt v.
Salisbury, Glenn v. Bergman, Mitchell v. Jensen, Heisen v. Churchill, all cited in note
50 supra. •
53. Hurt v. Salisbury, Heisen v. Churchill, both cited in note 50 supra.
54. Wesco Supply Co. v. Smith, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Thomas,
Burstein v. Palermo, all cited in note 50 supra.
55. Morse v. Burkart Mfg. Co., Garnett v. Richardson, Martin v. Fewell, Glenn
v. Bergman, Mitchell v. Jensen, all cited in note 50 supra.
56. Doty v. Patterson, Bond & Breswell v. Scott Lumber Co., Farmers Bank
v. Kuchs, Nebraska Bank v. Ferguson, Vanneman v. Young, Jessup v. Carnegie, all
cited in note 50 supra.
57. See, e.g., Wesco Supply Co. v. Smith, Doty v. Patterson, Nebraska Bank v.
Ferguson, Burstein v. Palermo, all cited in note 50 supra
58. See, e.g., Wesco Supply Co. v. Smith, Bond & Breswell v. Scott Lumber Co.,
Nebraska Bank v. Ferguson, Vanneman v. Young, all cited in note 50 supra.
59. See, e.g., Martin v. Fewell, Hurt v Salisbury, Heisen v. Churchill, all cited
in note 50 supra.
60. Mitchell v. Jensen, cited in note 50 supra.
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state. Hence, the reasoning in the opinions is strictly conceptual ("cor-
poration" or "no corporation"), and is not concerned with the question
of nexus, if any, between failure to record the articles with the secre-
tary of state and personal liability of the members of the association.
Nor do some of these courts appear to be aware that the designation
of an association as "not a corporation" does not determine what it is,
i.e., what attributes it does have. Describing an object as "not white"
does not reveal what its color is, and it would not be logical to conclude
from this description that the color of the object must be the opposite
of white, i.e., black. Similarly, the members of an association which
is "not a corporation" are not by logical inevitability partners. Sound
policy may induce a court to decree that the attributes of an associa-
tion resulting from a defective attempt to incorporate shall be adjudged
in relation to the character of the defect and the legislative purpose be-
hind the requirement.
There is very little difference between the outcome of these cases
as a group and the results of the group of cases in which there had been
no recordation at all and dealings were on a corporate basis.6 Ap-
parently, when the articles have not been recorded with the secretary
of state, the courts regard recordation in the local county almost as the
equivalent of no recordation at all. To further test this conclusion the
cases will next be examined in which the articles were recorded with
the secretary of state but not locally.
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION RECORDED WITH SECRETARY OF STATE
BUT NOT RECORDED LOCALLY
There have been eighteen cases 62 in which actions were brought
to hold shareholders personally liable on the ground that the statutory
requirement of recording the articles locally had not been fulfilled, al-
though the purported articles of incorporation had been recorded in the
office of the secretary of state. The results of these cases emphasizes
the importance of the presence or absence of the fact that the dealings
between plaintiff and the association were on a corporate basis. In
61. See text at notes 5, 21 and 22 swpra.
62. Gazette Pub. Co. v. Brady, 204 Ark. 396, 162 S.W.2d 494 (1942) ; Humphreys
v. Mooney, 5 Colo. 282 (1880); Inter-Ocean Newspaper Co. v. Robertson, 296 Ill.
92, 129 N.E. 523 (1921); Hall v. RoJertson, 213 IlL. App. 147 (1919); Brown v.
Melick, 185 Ill. App. 3 (1913) ; Hamill v. Watts, 180 Ill. App. 279 (1913); Curtis
v. Meeker, 62 Ill. App. 49 (1895); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Weatherhogg, 103 Ind.
App. 506, 4 N.E.2d 679 (1936); Newcomb-Endicott Co. v. Fee, 167 Mich. 574, 133
N.W. 540 (1911) ; Diamond Rubber Co. v. Fohey, 111 Miss. 654, 71 So. 906 (1916) ;
Granby Co. v. Richards, 95 Mo. 106, 8 S.W. 246 (1888) ; Railroad Gazette v. Wherry,
58 Mo. App. 423 (1894) ; Swofford Co. v. Owen, 37 Okla. 616, 133 Pac. 193 (1913) ;
Tonge v. Item Pub. Co., 244 Pa. 417, 91 Atl. 229 (1914); N.Y. Bank v. Crowell,
177 Pa. 313, 35 Atl. 613 (1896.) ; Guckert v. Hacke, 159 Pa. 303, 28 Atl. 249 (1893) ;
Campbell v. Beaman, 68 Pa. Super. 30 (1917) ; Refsnes v. Myers, 164 Wash. 205, 2
P.2d 656 (1931).
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thirteen of the cases o3 the plaintiff had understood that the association
with which he was contracting was a corporation, and in all but two
of these cases ", the shareholders were exonerated from personal lia-
bility. There were five cases " in which the plaintiff had not dealt with
the association on a corporate basis, and in each case he obtained a
judgment against the shareholders personally; but the significance of
this unanimity is somewhat diminished by the fact that four of the five
cases emerged from a single state, namely, Pennsylvania.
Again the degree of the defendants' activity in the management
of the enterprise proved unimportant. In the two cases 66 of dealings
on a corporate basis in which the defendants did not escape liability,
they had not been active in the management. In the five cases where
the dealings had not been on a corporate basis, in all of which judgment
went against the defendants, they had been inactive associates in two, 7
and participants in the management in the remaining three."
The reasoning to be found in these cases is as unsatisfactory as in
those in the preceding sections. Almost invariably the opinions in
favor of the defendants offer in justification the mere assertion that a
"de facto" corporation has been formed, despite the failure to record
the articles locally. In the cases in which the plaintiff's claim against
the shareholders personally is upheld, the opinions do no more than
aver that, until the articles are recorded locally, corporate existence does
not begin, or that the shareholders are subject to the liability of part-
ners. Such statements simply assume the answer to the issue in ques-
tion, and do not provide a reason for the decision.
In the cases in the preceding section, where the articles had been re-
corded locally but not with the secretary of state, and the dealings were
on a corporate basis, the plaintiffs prevailed almost half of the time.
But in the cases in this section, where the articles had been recorded
with the secretary of state but not locally and the dealings were on a
corporate basis, the plaintiffs practically never succeeded in their efforts
63. Gazette Pub. Co. v. Brady, Humphreys v. Mooney, Inter-Ocean Newspaper
Co. v. Robertson, Hall v. Robertson, Brown v. Melick, Curtiss v. Meeker, Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Weatherhogg, Newcomb-Endicott Co. v. Fee, Diamond Rubber Co. v.
Fohey, Granby Co. v. Richards, Railroad Gazette v. Wherry, Swofford Co. v. Owen,
Refsnes v. Myers, all cited in note 62 supra.
64. Gazette Pub. Co. v. Brady, Hall v. Robertson, both cited in note 62 supra.
In reality the Gazette Pub. Co. case stands alone, for the Supreme Court of Illinois,
two years after the decision in Hall v. Robertson, decided in favor of the defendants
in a similar suit involving the same association. See Inter-Ocean Newspaper Co. v.
Robertson, supra note 62.
65. Hamill v. Watts, Tonge v. Item Pub. Co., N.Y. Bank v. Crowell, Guckert v.
Hacke, Campbell v. Beaman, all cited in note 62 supra.
66. See note 64 supra.
67. Tonge v. Item Pub. Co., and Campbell v. Beaman, both cited in note 62 supra.
68. Hamill v Watts, N.Y. Bank v. Crowell, Guckert v. Hacke, all cited in note
62 supra.
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to hold the shareholders personally responsible. Why do the decisions
reflect this sharp distinction? To state that, when the articles have been
recorded only with the secretary of state, a "de facto" corporation has
been created is merely to reiterate with the aid of a Latin phrase the
conclusion that the defendants are not personally liable. But why are
they liable so much more frequently when the articles have been re-
corded only locally? Is it because the secretary of state is a more im-
portant official than the county clerk? Is it because the public is more
likely to search in the secretary of state's office than in the county
clerk's office for the status of the association? Is it because it is more
important, for tax or other reasons, that the state rather than the
county should be officially informed that the associates claim to be in-
corporated? Telling those who have recorded the articles only locally
that they are not a "de facto" corporation provides no reason for or
against their personal liability. If a patient tells his doctor that his (the
patient's) hair is falling out in patches, and the doctor informs him
that he is suffering from alopecia areata, the patient may get some com-
fort from having been told in Latin that his hair is falling out in
patches. 9 But when a judge is officially asked to determine whether
or not certain defendants are personally liable, it does not suffice for
him merely to declare, with or without resort to Latin, that the de-
fendants are or are not so liable. The parties and their attorneys and
the legal profession are properly interested in the real reasoning upon
which the judge arrived at his conclusion.
INSUFFICIENT CAPITAL PAID IN
Statutes in many states stipulate that a new incorporation shall
receive a certain amount of capital before commencing to do business.
This requirement may be expressed in terms of a fixed minimum num-
ber of dollars, e.g., $1000, or in terms of a minimum percentage of the
authorized capital stock; or the provision may be that stock subscrip-
tions shall be fully paid in cash. The statutes referred to in the cases
analyzed in this section do not expressly provide that limited liability
of the associates shall be suspended during any period of non-compli-
ance. A number of cases have arisen, however, in which creditors of
the association have sought to charge the members or officers with
personal liability, either because the statutory minimum of capital had
not been furnished to the alleged corporation, or because, in the absence
69. If a patient reveals to his doctor that he is suffering from a case of sunburn,
would it aid him to have the doctor diagnose his ailment as dermatitis calorica (in-
flammation of the skin produced by heat)?
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of a statutory requirement, the association had issued no shares and re-
ceived no capital prior to incurring the obligation in question.
It might be contended that the cases in this section are not relevant
to this article, because they relate to the internal organization of a cor-
poration rather than to the steps in the process of incorporating, and
hence are not related to the "de facto" doctrine. But if one conceives
of the term "corporation" as a short-hand method of describing the
presence of a number of legal attributes, including limited liability, then
any inquiry into the combination of circumstances that will or will not
result in this attribute is appropriate to an analysis of the "de facto"
doctrine. In other words, the inquiry throughout this article has been
not what are the facts that will produce that complex aggregate of legal
relations called "corporation," but what are the facts that will produce
freedom from personal liability (limited liability) among those who
purport to have incorporated-and the presence or absence of sufficient
capital appears to have an important bearing on this matter. Indeed,
one might readily perceive a more direct connection between immunity
from individual responsibility (limited liability) and the establishment
of a substitute fund in the form of adequate association capital than be-
tween limited liability and recordation of the articles with the secretary
of state. But the decisions do not sustain this idea.
Thirty-eight cases 70 have been examined which present some
problem concerning the individual responsibility of members of a char-
tered association for its obligations, based in whole or in part upon
an alleged insufficiency in the paid-in capital of the association. In
70. Christian Co. v. Fruitdale Co., 121 Ala. 340, 25 So. 566 (1899); Williams
Co. v. Quin, 44 Cal. App. 296, 186 Pac. 401 (1919); Ward-Truitt Co. v. Bryan &
Lamb, 144 Ga. 769, 87 S.E. 1037 (1916); Brooke v. Day, 129 Ga. 694, 59 S.E. 769
(1907) ; Burns v. Beck, 83 Ga. 471, 10 S.E. 121 (1889) ; Wright Co. v. Saul, 31 Ga.
App. 129, 120 S.E. 23 (1923) ; Orr v. McLeay, 6 Ga. App. 417, 65 S.E. 164 (1909) ;
Murdock v. Lamb, 92 Kan. 859, 142 Pac. 961 (1914); Central Nat. Bank v. Sheldon,
86 Kan. 460, 121 Pac. 340 (1912) ; Whetstone v. Crane Co., 1 Kan. App. 320, 41 Pac.
211 (1895) ; Provident Bank v. Saxon, 116 La. 408, 40 So. 778 (1906) ; Laflin Co. v.
Sensheimer, 46 Md. 315 (1876) ; Salem Bank v. Almy, 117 Mass. 476 (1875) ; Love
v. Ramsey, 139 Mich 47, 102 N.W. 279 (1905) ; Gow v. Collin, 109 Mich. 45, 66 N.W.
676 (1896) ; American Co. v. Bulkley, 107 Mich. 447, 65 N.W. 291 (1895) ; Moe v.
Harris, 142 Minn. 442, 172 N.W. 494 (1919); Johnson v. Corser, 34 Minn. 355, 25
N.W. 799 (1886) ; Quinn v. Woods, 134 Miss. 621, 99 So. 510 (1924) ; Natl. Bank v.
Rockefeller, 195 Mo. 15, 93 S.W. 761 (1906); Webb v. Rockefeller, 195 Mo. 57, 93
S.W. 772 (1906); Journal Co. v. Nelson, 133 Mo. App. 482, 113 S.W. 690 (1908);
Hyatt v. Van Riper, 105 Mo. App. 664, 78 S.W. 1043 (1904) ; Davidson v. Hobson,
59 Mo. App. 130 (1894) ; Bank v. Hall, 35 Ohio St. 158 (1878) ; Medill v. Collier,
16 Ohio St. 599 (1866) ; Bec]c v. Stimmel, 39 Ohio App. 510, 177 N.E. 920 (1931) ;
Garwood v. Great Western Oil Co., 11 Ohio App. 96 (1919); Industrial B. & L.
Assoc. v. Williams, 131 Okla. 167, 268 Pac. 228 (1928) ; Rutherford v. Hill, 22 Ore.
218, 29 Pac. 546- (1892) ; McVicker v. Cone, 21 Ore. 353, 28 Pac. 76 (1891) ; Cochran
v. Arnold, 58 Pa. 399 (1868); Paterson v. Arnold, 45 Pa. 410 (1863); Meyer v.
Brunson, 104 S.C. 84, 88 S.E. 359 (1916) ; Crouch v. Gray, 154 Tenn. 521, 290 S.W.
391 (1926); Berwald v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 22 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1929);
Berwald v. Tweedie Footwear Co., 22 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1929); American Co. v.
Kinnear, 56 Wash. 210, 105 Pac. 630 (1909).
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thirty-three 7' cases the dealings were on a corporate basis, and in
twenty-two 72 of these cases the associates were not subjected to in-
dividual liability. In short, the odds are here two to one in favor of the
defendants, whereas their chances are only about fifty-fifty when the
articles havie not been recorded with the secretary of state.
73
The factor of activity in the management of the association bulks
somewhat larger here than in most of the other sections of this article.
Inactive defendants were exonerated in nine cases 74 and held liable in
three 7, (3-1), whereas the ratio with respect to defendants active in
the management was thi-rteen 76 to eight 77 (almost 3-2).
In the remaining five cases 71 the dealings were not on a corporate
basis, and once again this seems to have been a most significant cir-
cumstance. Here, in marked contrast to the other thirty-three cases, 9
the defendants were uniformly held to be personally liable for the plain-
tiff's claim, despite the fact that in four 80 of the five cases the defend-
ants had not been active in the management.
From these insufficient-capital cases there emerges a new factor
not heretofore observed in this analysis of the incident of limited lia-
71. Williams Co. v. Qtin, Ward-Truitt Co. v. Bryan & Lamb, Burns v. Beck,
Wright Co. v. Saul, Orr v. McLeay, Murdock v. Lamb, Central Nat Bank v. Sheldon,
Whetstone v. Crane Co., Provident Bink v. Saxon, Laflin Co. v. Sensheimer, Salem
Bank v. Almy, Love v. Ramsey, Gow. v. Collin, American Co. v. Bulkley, Moe v.
Harris, 142 Minn. 442, 172 N.W. 494 (1919) ; Johnson v. Corser, 34 Minn. 355, 25
Rockefeller, Journal Co. v. Nelson, Hyatt v. Van Riper, Davidson v. Hobson, Bank v.
Hall, Garwood v. Great Western Oil Co., Industrial B. & L. Assoc. v. Williams,
Rutherford v. Hill, Cochran v. Arnold, Paterson v. Arnold, Meyer v. Brunson,
Crouch v. Gray, Berwald v. Hamiltorn-Brown Shoe Co., Berwald v. Tweedie Foot-
wear Co., American Co. v. Kinnear, all cited in note 70 supra.
72. Williams Co. v. Quin, Wright Co. v. Saul, Orr v. McLeay, Murdock v. Lamb,
Laflin Co. v. Sensheimer, Salem Bank v. Almy, Love v. Ramsey, Gow v. Collin,
American Co. v. Bulkley, Moe v. Harris, Quinn v. Woods, Natl. Bank v. Rockefeller,
Webb. v. Rockefeller, Bank v. Hall, Garwood v. Great Western Oil Co., Industrial
B. & L. Assoc. v. Williams, Rutherford v. Hall, Cochran v. Arnold, Crouch v. Gray,
Berwald v. Tweedie Footwear Co., 22 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1929); American Co. v.
73. See text at notes 51 and 52 supra.
74. Williams Co. v. Quin, Orr v. McLeay, Laflin v. Sensheimer, American Co. v.
Bulkley, Quinn v. Woods, Webb v. Rockefeller, Bank v. Hall, Garwood v. Great
Western Oil Co., Rutherford v. Hill, all cited in note 70 supra.
75. Provident Bank v. Saxon, Johnson v. Corser, Meyer v. Brunson, all cited in
note 70 supra.
76. Wright Co. v. Saul, Murdock v. Lamb, Salem Bank v. Almy, Gow v. Collin,
Love v. Ramsey, Moe v. Harris, Natl. Bank v. Rockefeller, Industrial B. & L. Assoc.
v. Williams, Cochran v. Arnold, Crouch v. Gray, Berwald v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe
Co., Berwald v. Tweedie Footwear Corp., American Co. v. Kinnear, all cited in note
70 supra.
77. Burns v. Beck, Ward-Truitt Co. v. Bryan & Lamb, Central Nat. Bank v.
Sheldon, Whetstone v. Crane Co., Davidson v. Hobson, Hyatt v. Van Riper, Journal
Co. v. Nelson, Paterson v. Arnold, all cited in note 70 supra.
78. Christian Co. v. Fruitdale Co., Brooke v. Day, Medill v. Collier, Beck v.
Stimmel, McVicker v. Cone, all cited in note 70 supra.
79. See note 71 supra.
80. Brooke v. Day, Medill v. Collier, Beck v. Stimmel, McVicker v. Cone, all
cited in note 70 supra.
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bility. If no stock subscriptions are obtained, no shares issued and no
capital paid in, this fact situation is apparently regarded by the judi-
ciary as a much stronger basis for imposing personal liability upon the
defendant associates than if some shares have been issued and some
capital paid in, even though this performance may be materially less
than the statutory requirement. Of the thirty-eight insufficient-capital
cases, sixteen 81 involved situations in which the defendants had ob-
tained a corporate charter and begun business in corporate form but
without causing the corporation to be provided with any capital prior to
incurring the obligation sued on by the plaintiff. In eleven s2 of these
sixteen cases personal liability was imposed upon the defendants,
whereas in the other twenty-two cases 83 in which some capital had been
paid in, although allegedly an insufficient amount, liability was imposed
upon the defendants in only five instances."4 In short, where no capital
has been paid in, the odds are against the defendants more than two to
one, but when some capital, though less than alleged to be required,
has been paid in, the odds are in favor of defendants more than three
to one.
But the reasoning in the opinions does not explain or even reflect
this marked distinction between no capital and some capital. Where
the defendants are found by the court to be personally liable, the reason
frequently assigned, whether a no capital or a some capital situation,
is that there was a "substantial" non-compliance with a statutory re-
quirement, or that the corporation had no legal existence; no difference
in degree is asserted, and yet it is a fact that in eleven 85 of the sixteen
cases 86 of personal liability, no capital had been paid in. Where the
81. Provident Bank v. Saxon, Johnson v. Corser, Williams Co. v. Quin, Ruther-
ford v. Hill, Ward-Truitt Co. v. Bryan & Lamb, Central Nat. Bank v. Sheldon,
Whetstone v. Crane Co., Davidson v. Hobson, Hyatt v. Van Riper, Moe v. Harris,
Natl. Bank v. Rockefeller, Industrial B. & L. Assoc. v. Williams, Brooke v. Day, Beck
v. Stimmel, McVicker v. Cone, Christian Co. v. Fruitdale Co., all cited in note
70 supra.
82. Provident Bank v. Saxon, Johnson v. Corser, Ward-Truitt Co. v. Bryan &
Lamb, Central Nat. Bank v. Sheldon, Whetstone v. Crane Co., Davidson v. Hobson,
Hyatt v. Van Riper, Brooke v. Day, Beck v. Stimmel, McVicker v. Cone, Christian
Co. v. Fruitdale Co., all cited in note 70 supra.
83. Burns v. Beck, Wright Co. v. Saul, Orr v. McLeay, Murdock v. Lamb,
Laflin Co. v. Sensheimer, Salem Bank v. Almy, Love v. Ramsey, Gow v. Collin,
American Co. v. Bulkley, Quinn v. Woods, Webb v. Rockefeller, Journal Co. v.
Nelson, Bank v. Hall, Medill v. Collier, Garwood v. Great Western Oil Co., Cochran
v. Arnold, Paterson v. Arnold, Meyer v. Brunson, Crouch v. Gray, Berwald v.
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., Berwald v. Tweedie Footvear Co., American Co. v.
Kinnear, all cited in note 70 supra.
84. Meyer v. Brunson, Burns v. Beck, Journal Co. v. Nelson, Paterson v. Arnold,
Medill v. Collier, all cited in note 70 supra.
85. See note 82 supra.
86. Christian Co. v. Fruitdale, Ward-Truitt Co. v. Bryan & Lamb, Brooke v.
Day, Burns v. Beck, Central Nat. Bank v. Sheldon, Whetstone v. Crane Co., Provident
Bank v. Saxon, Johnson v. Corser, Journal Co. v. Nelson, Hyatt v. Van Riper, David-
son v. Hobson, Medill v. Collier, Beck v. Stimmel, McVicker v. Cone, Paterson v.
Arnold, Meyer v. Brunson, all cited in note 70 mtpra.
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defendants are exonerated from personal liability, the courts proclaim,
in both the no capital and the some capital cases, that a "de facto" cor-
poration has been formed, or that there may be no collateral attack
upon the defendants for their corporate shortcomings, or that the plain-
tiffs are estopped. But of the twenty-two non-liability cases s1 only
five " involved a complete absence of capital paid in. There would
appear to be a strong judicial aversion to permitting members of incor-
porated associations to claim freedom from personal liability before
they have provided the association with any capital, but this aversion
is not articulate in the opinions.
SUMMARY
In the foregoing five sections one hundred and twenty-four cases
have been classified. Eighty-seven additional cases have been assem-
bled in which various other types of defects in the incorporating process
were involved and in which claims were asserted against the corporate
associates personally because of such irregularities. But with respect
to each of these miscellaneous defects, there are too few cases to enable
one to draw any significant conclusions. For example, there are seven
cases 89 of unauthorized corporate purpose, fourteen cases o involving
various types of omitted publicity requirements, six cases 91 in which
the incorporation statute was allegedly unconstitutional, seven cases 92
87. See note 72 supra.
88. Williams v. Quin, Rutherford v. Hill, Moe v. Harris, Natl. Bank v. Rocke-
feller, Industrial B. & L. Assoc. v. Williams, all cited in note 70 .upra.
89. Staacke v. Routledge, 175 S.W. 444 (Tex. 1915), rev'd in part, 111 Tex. 489,
241 S.W. 994 (1922) ; Ivy Press v. McKechnie, 88 Wash. 643, 153 Pac. 1067 (1915) ;
Mann v. Commonwealth Bond Corp., 27 F. Supp. 315 (S.D. N.Y. 1938); Merchants'
& Mfr's Bank v. Stone, 38 Mich. 779 (1878) ; Natl. Bank v. Texas Investment Co.,
74 Tex. 421, 12 S.W. 101 (1889) ; Vredenburg v. Behan, 33 La. Ann. 627 (1881);
Mandeville v. Courtright, 142 Fed. 97 (3d Cir. 1905).
90. Standard Varnish Co. v. Joy, 149 Ill. App. 25 (1909); Louisiana Bank v.
Henderson, 116 La. 413, 40 So. 779 (1906) ; Williams v. Hewitt, 47 La. Ann. 1076,
17 So. 496 (1895). Bergeron v. Hobbs, 96 Wis. 641, 71 N.W. 1056 (1897); Henry
v. Markesan State Bank, 68 F.2d 554 (8th Cir. 1934); Hoyt v. McCallum, 102 Ill.
App. 287 (1902); Sentell & Co. v. Hewitt, 50 La. Ann. 3, 22 So. 970 (1898);
Kleckner v. Turk, 45 Neb. 176, 63 N.W. 469 (1895); Hogue v. Capital Bank, 47
Neb. 929, 66 N.W. 1036 (1896); Cory v. Lee, 93 Ala. 468, 8 So. 694 (1891);
Chieppo v. Chieppo, 88 Conn. 233, 90 Atl. 940 (1914); Kraemer v. Graf, 105 F.2d
117 (10th Cir. 1939) ; Clinton Co. v. Schwarz, 175 Ill. App. 577 (1912) ; Pilsen Brew-
ing Co. v. Wallace, 291 Ill. 59, 125 N.E. 714 (1919).
91. Planters' & Miners' Bank v. Padgett, 69 Ga. 159 (1882) ; Jennings v. Dark,
175 Ind. 332, 92 N.E. 778 (1910); McClinch v. Sturgis, 72 Me. 288 (1881);
Richards v. Minnesota Savings Bank, 75 Minn. 196, 77 N.W. 822 (1899); Eaton v.
Walker, 76 Mich. 579, 43 N.W. 638 (1889) ; Chenango Bridge Co. v. Paige, 83 N.Y.
178 (1880).
92. Kaiser v. Lawrence Savings Bank, 56 Iowa 104, 8 N.W. 772 (1881) ; Snider's
Sons' Co. v. Troy, 91 Ala. 224, 8 So. 658 (1890) ; Johnson v. Okerstrom, 70 Minn.
303, 73 N.W. 147 (1897) ; Stout v. Zulick, 48 N.J.L. 599, 7 AtI. 362 (1886) ; American
Co. v. Heidenheimer, 80 Tex. 344, 15 S.W. 1038 (1891); Shields v. Clifton Co., 94
Tenn. 123, 28 S.W. 668 (1894) ; Tennessee Co. v. Massey, 56 S.W. 35 (Tenn 1899).
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of defects in the execution of the articles, and so forth. To complete
the picture these eighty-seven cases have been lumped under the head-
ing "miscellaneous" and are included in the table on page 1174.
In recapitulation of the results of this entire body of two hundred
and eleven cases, it appears that the factor of dealings on a corporate
basis is of major importance. When the dealings were on a corporate
basis, the defendants were held not to be personally liable in over sixty
percent of the cases. But where there was no indication that the plain-
tiff negotiated with the association as a corporation, the members of
the defective incorporation were denied limited liability in thirty out
of thirty-two cases. Moreover, if the cases are examined as a 'Vhole,
i.e., where the dealings were on a corporate basis, it develops that the
managing associates fare to a minor degree discernably worse than
those inactive in the management. The inactive associates prevailed
almost sixty-four percent of the time, whereas the managing defend-
ants won less than fifty-nine percent of their cases.
CONCLUSION
When one endeavors to make a complete collection of the decided
cases in a given field of law and painstakingly to analyze the opinions
thus collected, he normally has a -dual objective: first, to discover what
the courts have actually been deciding in the area under survey (what
facts have led to what legal consequences), and secondly, to ascertain
why the courts have decided the cases the way they have. Such com-
prehensive studies and analyses are rather infrequent, perhaps because
the twin endeavors can seldom, if ever, be satisfactorily realized. Let
us first examine the "what."
The major difficulty in trying to extract from a mass of somewhat
related cases an accurate formulation of what the courts have decided
arises from the endless factual variations. Two or more cases are never
identical; yet they may be similar, or at least analogous. But by what
standard is similarity or analogy to be determined? In this article I
have utilized three major bases of factual classification: (a) the type
of defect in the incorporating process; (b) whether or not the dealings
between the plaintiff and the association were on a corporate basis; and
(c) whether or not the defendants were active in the management of
the association. But even the types of defect are not clear-cut in many
of the cases; for example, sometimes a given case may involve more
than one defect, and then one must either decidt that one of the defects
is dominant in the decision or create a separate category for this type
of multiple defect. The decision as to whether a given transaction
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was on a corporate basis or not is even more arbitrary, for this factor
frequently is not stressed in the opinion. Moreover, the classification of
the defendants as active or inactive in management is often a matter of
defendants as active or inactive in management is often a matter of
considerable doubt, especially if they did not participate in the forma-
tion of the association or in the particular transaction sued upon.
Nevertheless, despite these difficulties, I developed certain princi-
ples of classification for the hybrid or maverick fact situations, and by
endeavoring to group the cases with candor and consistency, I have
arrived at a few conclusions as to what the courts have been deciding
concerning the personal liability of members of defectively incorporated
associations for obligations of their associations.
1. If the plaintiff did not accept the association as a corporation,
as in the typical tort situation, or if the fact that the association claimed
to be incorporated was unknown to him (i.e., if the dealings were not
on a corporate basis), and if he elects to sue the members of the asso-
ciation individually instead of the association as such, he is virtually
certain to succeed, in so far as the issue of their personal liability is
concerned, if he can show almost any kind of a failure to comply with
the statutory provisions for incorporation or with statutory conditions
precedent to the commencement of business in corporate form. I base
this conclusion on the fact that in thirty out of thirty-two cases in
which the dealings were not on a corporate basis, the plaintiff prevailed
although the cases involved a considerable variety of different types of
defects. And yet the emphasis in the "de facto" doctrine, as tradi-
tionally expressed, is entirely upon the character of the defect ("color-
able" attempt) and not at all upon the nature of the dealings between
the parties.
2. If the articles of incorporation had not been recorded at all,
either with the secretary of state or locally in the designated county
office, prior to the transaction with the plaintiff, and if the dealings'
with him were on a corporate basis, an action by the plaintiff to hold
the members of the association personally liable to him has little more
than an even chance of success. Recordation of the articles locally but
not with the secretary of state produced only a minor variation in this
outcome. These are startling results, for one might reasonably have
assumed that failure to record the articles with the secretary of state,
and especially failure to record at all, would be regarded by practically
all judges as not constituting a "colorable" attempt to incorporate, and
therefore as not extending to the defendants the immunity of the "de
facto" doctrine.
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The cases referred to in the foregoing paragraph illustrate a sig-
nificant analytical principle. If the defect in the effort to incorporate is
of such a character as to justify the label "de facto corporation," the
legal dogma is that the members of the association have the attribute
of limited liability; but it is a legal and logical fallacy to conclude in the
converse situation, i.e., when the defect induces the court to refrain
from describing the association as a "de facto corporation," that the
members are necessarily individually liable to an unlimited extent. Al-
though the factors sufficient for recognition of a "de facto corporation"
may be absent, there may be other factors that provide the associates
with legal protection from personal liability; " e.g., they may by con-
tract limit their liability in relation to a specific person.
3. Where the plaintiff has dealt on a corporate basis with an asso-
ciation which, unbeknown to him, has made no attempt to incorporate,
he is not precluded from suing the members of the association individ-
ually. In about half of the cases in which the plaintiff had dealt on a
corporate basis with an association which had drafted articles of incor-
poration but had not recorded them with the secretary of state or at
all, the defendant associates were held to be protected by the corpo-
rate nature of the dealings from personal liability. But where there
have been no steps toward incorporation, the associates are afforded no
such protection, and the fact that the transaction was on a corporate
basis is not said to "estop" the plaintiff from pursuing the associates
personally.
4. If the articles have been recorded with the secretary of state,
although not recorded locally, and if the dealings were on a corporate
basis, the associates are almost invariably accorded freedom from per-
sonal liability.
5. If the associates begin business in corporate form before obtain-
ing any capital for the corporation, the courts are very likely to hold
them personally liable for obligations of the association, even though
the claimant dealt with the association on a corporate basis. But if
the associates cause some capital to be paid in, though less than the re-
quired amount, those who dealt with them on a corporate basis have
only a slim chance of imposing personal liability upon the associates.
93. Similarly, from the proposition that a contract is enforceable if supported
by consideration, it does not follow logically that a pronlise is not enforceable if not
supported by consideration. Although the presence of "consideration" is enough to
render a promise enforceable, it may be that even in the absence of "consideration"
other factors may induce courts to enforce promises. Of course, one might say that
anything that induces courts to enforce a promise is "consideration," but so defined
the term would have no definitive value.
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6. A summary of all the cases reveals that those active in the man-
agement of defectively incorporated associations have been subjected to
personal liability to a somewhat greater extent than inactive sharehold-
ers. But when the cases involving any particular defect are separately
examined, this factor does not stand out significantly, and one is not
justified in concluding that participation in management is an impor-
tant factor in predicting the probable impact of a defect in incorporation
upon the liability of the members.
The foregoing analyses and conclusions indicate that the tradi-
tional doctrine of a "de facto" corporation is just so much jargon and
ought to be abandoned. For those to whom this thought is repugnant
two propositions might be culled from the decided cases: for the pur-
pose of determining the presence or absence of the attribute of limited
liability, (1) an association which has recorded articles of incorpora-
tion with the secretary of state is a "de facto" corporation, and the
shareholders have limited liability if the dealings were on a corporate
basis; and (2) an association which has made no attempt to incorpo-
rate is not a "de facto" corporation, and the associates are personally
liable whether or not the dealings were on a corporate basis. With
respect to other forms of defects or omissions in the incorporating
process one cannot legitimately express any generalization in terms of
the "de facto" doctrine, except possibly to state that for the purpose of
determining the presence or absence of the attribute of limited liability,
if the dealings were not on a corporate basis, an association which is
in any respect defectively incorporated is not a "de facto" corporation,
and the members are personally liable whether active in the manage-
ment or not.
But even- in the formulation of these propositions nothing is gained
or clarified by including the statement that the association "is a 'de
facto' corporation" or that it "is not a 'de facto' corporation." Omit
these clauses and the propositions are just as meaningful. The asser-
tion that the association is or that it is not a "de facto" corporation is
not a reason for the result of limited or unlimited liability. Limited
liability is only one of several corporate attributes, and apart from this
incident one cannot safely predict whether, for some other purpose, the
association will or will not be classified as a "de facto" corporation.
Consequently, the statement in the foregoing propositions that the as-
sociation is or is not a "de facto" corporation is literally nothing more
than a somewhat obscure way of stating that the associates do or do
not enjoy limited liability.
Moreover, the "de facto" statement, in addition to being pure sur-
plusage, can be positively misleading. A case which states that, if the
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articles are recorded locally but not with the secretary of state, the as-
sociates are personally liable, is not likely to be cited for fhe proposition
that such an association cannot acquire real property in the association
name because this is so obviously a different issue. But if the first
case states that the association in question is not a "de facto" corpora-
tion and "therefore" the associates are personally liable, those who do
not concentrate on the purpose for which the association was judicially
referred to as not a "de facto" corporation may be tempted subsequently
to cite the case for the proposition that such a defectively incorporated
association is not a "de facto" corporation and "therefore" it cannot
acquire real property in its association name.
We come now to an inquiry into the "why" behind the decisions.
Why do the courts almost invariably hold the associates personally
liable if the dealings were not on a corporate basis, regardless of the
nature of the defect? If the articles were recorded with the secretary
of state but not locally, why do the courts with virtual unanimity exon-
erate the associates from personal liability if the dealings were on a
corporate basis? If, on the other hand, the articles were recorded lo-
cally but not with the secretary of state, why do the courts almost half
of the time impose personal liability on the associates even though the
dealings were on a corporate basis?
Categorical answers to these questions cannot be extracted from
the opinions. As indicated heretofore, if the decision is adverse to the
defendants, the court is quite likely to assign as a reason that the asso-
ciation is not a "de facto" corporation; but, as observed above, this
is not a reason but a mere reiteration of the ultimate judgment. If
the decision is in favor of the defendants and the dealings were on a
corporate basis, the court will frequently state that the plaintiff is
"estopped" from imposing personal liability on the defendants. But
why such plaintiffs are "estopped" when the articles have been recorded
only with the secretary of state, and not when they have been recorded
only locally, the opinions do not reveal.
One can ponder upon so-called policy considerations which, al-
though not articulate in the opinions, may have been latent in the judi-
cial mind. But such speculations do not appeal to me as particularly
profitable. In arguing a particular case and commenting on prior de-
cisions one may offer "good" reasons for or against certain judgments,
even though these may not be the "real" reasons which induced the re-
sults. This, however, is largely a matter of personal opinion, unless
there is a body of data from which substantiating support may be
drawn. The fact remains that in the cases analyzed in this article the
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courts have rarely given either real reasons or good reasons,94 despite
the emptiness of the "de facto" doctrine upon which they verbally rely.
Fortunately, however, modern corporate legislation " is rapidly mini-
mizing the area of defective incorporation,"6 and in time the doctrine
of the "de facto" corporation may become merely an historic example
of legal conceptualism at its worst.
94. This is not a matter peculiar to corporation law or the "de facto" doctrine,
but is a common failing of the judiciary which a similarly critical examination of a
body of cases in many another field of law will reveal. Many statements of legal
conclusions which can be expressed in quite simple form are in reality complex
utterances, if their complete implications are understood and intended. John Smith
has possession of chattel X. John Smith has title to Blackacre. John Smith has
entered into a common law marriage with Mary Jones. In order for such categorical
statements to be accepted as accurate, i.e., free from doubt, there must be some
normal sets of fact that persons learned in the law would agree are denoted by the
concepts "possession," "title" and "marriage." But when we encounter variations
from these "normal" fact situations, we discover that equally learned and competent
lawmen differ as to whether or not the facts in question surely denote "possession"
or "title" or "marriage," as the case may be. This confusion arises, as in the case
of "de facto" corporation, from the circumstance that these apparently simple state-
ments have as many possible ramifications as there are legal propositions expressed
in terms of "possession," "title," "marriage," etc. To illustrate: To perfect a gift of
a chattel, there must be a transfer of possession to the donee. To perfect an attach-
ment or levy of execution, the sheriff must take possession of the chattel. To perfect
a finding as to all but the rightful owner, the finder must take possession of the
chattel. The unqualified assertion that "John Smith has possession of chattel X"
in effect states that if the chattel was given to John Smith, the gift is effective; if
John Smith was an attaching sheriff, he will prevail over subsequent competing
sheriffs who attempt to levy on the same chattel; and if John Smith was a finder,
his rights are superior to those of a later "finder" of the same chattel. If John
Smith claims as a donee, what minimum physical relationship to chattel X must he
establish if he is to prevail? If he seeks to prevail as an attaching sheriff, or if he
claims as a finder, will he have to establish the same minimum factual relationship?
The answers are to be found, as in the case of the "de facto" doctrine, only by
examining and classifying the facts and the holdings of the pertinent cases. The
opinions will tell us that some prevailed because they obtained "possession," and
others did not prevail because they did not obtain "possession." But no one, includ-
ing the judge, was certain that anyone had "possession" until after the decision was
rendered! Will the judges recite the real or the good reasons for classifying cer-
tain sets of facts as "possession" and not others? They are no more likely to do so
than in the case of the "de facto" corporation concept
I have sought very briefly to illustrate that the "for what purpose" approach
to legal analysis is as applicable to the concept of "possession" as it is to the concept
of "de facto" corporation. Any legal concept which is employed in more than one
legal principle, such as "title, "marriage, "domicile "authority," etc., manifestly
requires a like analysis.
95. Certain pitfalls in the incorporating process have already been eliminated in
many states, e.g., dual recordation of the articles is not required in twenty states.
Fifteen states now provide that the issuance of a certificate of incorporation shall be
conclusive evidence of due incorporation as to all persons except the state of in-
corporation. Many states no longer require a stated minimum of paid-in capital.
Statutes expressly establishing the personal liability of designated persons for failure
to comply with mandatory requirements are becoming more common.
96. This trend is illustrated by the fact that, of the post 1910 cases analyzed in
this article, thirty-nine were decided between 1910 and 1919, thirty-four between 1920
and 1929, twenty-seven between 1930 and 1939, and only seven from 1940 to date.
